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On October 10, 1918, four days before United States v. Jacob Abrams 
went to trial, the government petitioned to sever the case against Jacob 
Schwartz and proceed against the remaining defendants without him.1  
Schwartz lay feverish in jail, a casualty of the influenza pandemic that 
had swept through the overcrowded and windowless cells of the 
Manhattan prison known as the Tombs.2  Fellow radicals attributed his 
susceptibility to the disease to a severe beating that he allegedly 
suffered under interrogation for his role in protesting the deployment 
of American troops to the Soviet Union.3  Soon after Judge Henry D. 
Clayton Jr. granted the government’s motion, Schwartz was transferred 
to the prison ward at Bellevue, though the hospital was already at 
double its capacity and the morgue had run out of room.4  Three days 
later, Schwartz succumbed to pneumonia.  “The hospital records state 
that he died of Spanish influenza,” a pamphlet urging a general amnesty 
for wartime “political prisoners” relayed, “but his comrades insist that 
 
*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Suzanne Young Murray Professor, Radcliffe 
Institute for Advanced Study.  I am grateful to participants at “Abrams at 100: A 
Reassessment of Holmes’s ‘Great Dissent,’” for helpful comments, and to Columbia Law 
School, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, the First 
Amendment Clinic at ASU Law, and the Seton Hall Law Review for their generous 
support of the symposium.  
 1 Transcript of Record at 20–21, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (No. 
316) [hereinafter Transcript of Record]. 
 2 RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND FREE 
SPEECH 91 (1987).   
 3 Id. at 88–95.  
 4 Id. at 91.   
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he was killed by police brutality.”5  His death spared him the twenty-
year prison terms that were meted out to most of his alleged co-
conspirators.  At sentencing, defendant Samuel Lipman reflected that he 
paid dearly for his commitment to the truth, though not as dearly as 
Schwartz, who had paid with his life.6  
The centennial of the Supreme Court’s decision in Abrams v. United 
States has occasioned myriad tributes to the birth of the modern First 
Amendment.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s testament to the “free 
trade in ideas” has been exalted for its soaring rhetoric as well as its 
penetrating distillation of the value of open debate.7  In the conventional 
account, Abrams marked a fateful and fundamental turning point.  
Before it, judges and juries capitulated to patriotic pressures and 
accepted the suppression of disfavored ideas as a cost of public safety or 
of majoritarian democracy.  After it, pioneering jurists came to recognize 
that “time has upset many fighting faiths,” and they joined a handful of 
progressive scholars in erecting judicial enforcement of the First 
Amendment as a barrier against government overreach.8  The Abrams 
dissent, in short, is a cornerstone of the American free speech tradition.  
The thrust of this essay is to suggest that the Abrams dissent was 
somewhat less momentous than it has been made out to be—or at least, 
that the case for its greatness is more attenuated than has traditionally 
been understood.  The essay begins with a brief description of the social 
and political climate that shaped the prosecution and that eventually 
informed the justices’ resolution of the case.  It then turns to the early 
 
 5 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS PRISON 14 
(1919).  Even sympathetic contemporaries were divided over whether the injuries 
Schwartz sustained during the interrogation were causally linked to his death, given that 
Schwartz also had an underlying heart condition.  Id. at 10; see also Zechariah Chafee Jr., 
A Contemporary State Trial—The United States Versus Jacob Abrams et al, 33 HARV. L. REV. 
747, 762 (1920).  
 6 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 30. 
 7 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). The 
dissent has been described as “glorious.” See, for example, 1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES & 
HAROLD J. LASKI, HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND 
HAROLD J. LASKI 222 (1928); FLOYD ABRAMS, FRIEND OF THE COURT: ON THE FRONT LINES WITH 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 412 (2013).  On Holmes’s use of the market metaphor, see Vincent 
Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 6–13; C. Edwin Baker, 
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 974–78 (1978). 
 8 Id.  For accounts tracing the modern First Amendment to the Espionage Act 
prosecutions and the Holmes and Brandeis dissents, see, for example, LEE C. BOLLINGER & 
GEOFFREY R. STONE, THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY (2019); MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE 
SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 2 (1991); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE 
MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS FROM WILSON TO FDR 8–9 
(1972); DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 1 (1997); GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 230 (2004).  
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reception of the Supreme Court’s decision and Justice Holmes’s fabled 
dissent among legal scholars and advocates.  In so doing, it offers a fuller 
picture of the perceived significance of the case when it was decided and 
of the unfamiliar and often counterintuitive uses to which the majority 
and dissenting opinions were put. 
Abrams indeed coincided with a wave of critical commentary 
among liberals who had previously accepted the suppression of antiwar 
expression.  It is also true that Justice Holmes’s dissent was widely 
disseminated in radical newspapers and the mainstream press.  Yet the 
import of the decision was not its interpretation of the First 
Amendment, much less a wholesale reimagining of the judicial role.  In 
the immediate aftermath of the decision, legal scholars found Holmes’s 
doctrinal analysis in dissent to be bemusing and inconsistent.  Some 
thought his departure from the majority opinion was narrowly confined, 
a disagreement about fact more than law or statutory more than 
constitutional interpretation; others treated his apparent about-face as 
an artifact of its timing, removed as it was from the exigencies of war, 
and thus a misapplication of his emerging “clear and present danger” 
test.9  Justice John Hessin Clarke, who wrote the majority opinion, was 
no paragon of judicial conservatism.  As Herbert Goodrich observed in 
the Michigan Law Review in 1921, “[d]espite the fact that the judges 
disagreed, it is difficult to put a finger on the exact difference between 
majority and minority as to the law.”10  
In short, in the months after Abrams was decided, hardly anyone 
imagined the dissent as a harbinger of aggressive First Amendment 
review of convictions for seditious activity, let alone judicial invalidation 
of democratically enacted laws.  As I have argued elsewhere, it would 
take at least another decade for that decidedly modern understanding 
of the First Amendment to take root.11  Still, there is no doubt that the 
Abrams dissent was an important and enduring one.  The themes that 
Abrams pushed into the public spotlight are every bit as relevant as the 
ones that have been thrust on the decision retroactively.   
In the wake of the Abrams case, liberals and radicals deployed 
Justice Holmes’s dissent to generate publicity for a national amnesty of 
all prisoners who had been prosecuted during the war for their 
 
 9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to 
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.”).  
 10 Herbert F. Goodrich, Does the Constitution Protect Free Speech, 19 MICH. L. REV. 487, 
493 (1921). 
 11 See generally LAURA WEINRIB, THE TAMING OF FREE SPEECH: AMERICA’S CIVIL LIBERTIES 
COMPROMISE (2016).  
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unorthodox beliefs.12  They invoked Abrams as a cautionary tale about 
the susceptibility of illiberal laws to misapplication and abuse, and they 
urged legislators and public officials to exercise restraint and to model 
broad-mindedness and tolerance.  They held out treatment of the 
defendants as evidence of longstanding complaints about police 
brutality and inhumane prison conditions in a period of profound 
economic inequality, labor unrest, hostility to immigration, and the 
uncertainty of a global pandemic.  
What the Abrams dissent did not do, however, was provoke an 
immediate reevaluation among progressives of the judicial enforcement 
of “constitutional limitations,” even in the domain of personal rights.13  
On the contrary, it exacerbated progressive concerns about juror bias, 
disproportionate sentencing, and weak or vindictive judges.  Indeed, it 
buttressed the belief among many of Justice Holmes’s most stalwart 
supporters that something must be done to cabin the power of the 
courts.  
I.  THE ABRAMS TRIAL AND THE AMBIT OF WARTIME SUPPRESSION 
In the summer of 1918, Jacob Abrams, Hyman Lachowsky, Samuel 
Lipman, Jacob Schwartz, and Mollie Steimer gathered in Harlem to 
commiserate over American military interference in Soviet Russia and 
to devise an appropriate response.14  Abrams, Lachowsky, and Schwartz 
worked as bookbinders.  Lipman was a furrier, and Steimer worked in a 
shirtwaist factory.  All five—four of whom were professed anarchists, 
and the fifth, Lipman, a socialist—were among the nearly half-million 
Russian Jews who arrived in the United States in the five years before 
Europe was plunged into war.15  None had applied for naturalization.  
For the time being, all welcomed the Bolshevik Revolution as the 
realization of their idealistic ambitions for radical political and 
economic change.16  
 
 12 See generally POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5. 
 13 The then-prevailing term for judicial review was most closely associated with 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (1st ed. 1868). 
 14 POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 41–42. 
 15 Id. at 4–11 (providing a detailed account of the defendants and of the events 
leading up to the arrests).   
 16 By the time the defendants were deported to the Soviet Union in November 1921, 
Steimer (and many other anarchists) had soured on the Revolution.  See, e.g., Girl Won’t 
Accept Deportation Offer, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1921 (“Steimer, who thinks the experiences 
of Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman is evidence that anarchists have a hard time 
in Russia, refuses to consent [to deportation].”).  
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The group resolved to purchase a printing press and distribute 
pamphlets urging American workers to support the revolution.  The 
resulting leaflets decried President Woodrow Wilson’s decision to 
dispatch American troops to Vladivostok, Russia.  Although Wilson had 
issued a statement disclaiming intervention in Russia’s “internal 
affairs,” the troops were deployed alongside the Allied expeditions that 
were assisting the anti-Communist White Russians in their struggle 
against the Bolsheviks.17  That decision was premised on alleged Soviet 
support for Germany, a justification that American radicals (and most 
subsequent historians) dismissed as a pretext.18  Incensed by the 
perceived betrayal, Lipman prepared an English circular that 
condemned Wilson as a “coward” who was unwilling to admit openly 
that “capitalistic nations cannot afford to have a proletarian republic in 
Russia.”19  He denounced capitalism as the “enemy of the workers of the 
world” and called upon Russian emigrants to “Rise!” and to “Put down 
your enemy and mine!”20  A separate Yiddish pamphlet written by 
Schwartz went further.  It urged the workers to “spit in the face [of] the 
false, hypocritic, military propaganda,” warning that liberty loans were 
funding the production of bullets that were used against Soviet workers, 
and that “[w]orkers in the ammunition factories” were churning out 
weapons to “murder . . . your dearest, best, who are in Russia and are 
fighting for freedom.”21  In an unguarded call to action, the pamphlet 
boldly declared that “our reply to the barbaric intervention has to be a 
general strike!”22  It enjoined “all rulers” to remember “that the hand of 
the revolution will not shiver in a fight.”23  
In August, with the assistance of a sympathetic acquaintance, 
Hyman Rosansky, who later disclosed their identities to the authorities, 
Lachowsky and Steimer distributed thousands of copies of the leaflets 
in the streets of New York.24  Along with Abrams, Lipman, and Schwartz, 
they were arrested and charged with violation of the 1917 Espionage 
Act and its 1918 (Sedition Act) amendments.  Attorney Harry 
 
 17 See GEORGE F. KENNAN, THE DECISION TO INTERVENE, in SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 
1917–1920, 482–85 (Princeton Univ. Press 1989) (1958). 
 18 See POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 117. 
 19 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 16. 
 20 Id. at 17. 
 21 Id. at 18–19. 
 22 Id. at 19.  
 23 Id.  The English translation of the Yiddish pamphlet quoted here, which was 
entered into evidence in the trial, contained some errors.  See POLENBERG, supra note 2, 
at 51–53.  
 24 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618 (1919).  Rosansky attracted attention 
by throwing the pamphlets from a high window, which prompted the inquiry and 
subsequent arrests.  See id. 
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Weinberger, a seasoned veteran of constitutional contestation over 
repressive wartime legislation, defended all of them in the Southern 
District of New York and on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.  
In October 1918, a jury swiftly and unanimously convicted them.25  One 
year later, a seven-justice majority of the Supreme Court upheld their 
convictions in Abrams v. United States.26 
As the Abrams case wound its way through the courts, the United 
States was on the brink of transition from “war hysteria” to “Red 
hysteria.”27  The conversion was a matter of degree rather than kind.  
Since its entry into World War I in the spring of 1917, the country had 
been swept up in jingoistic repression.  Public officials and ordinary 
Americans had closed ranks to stomp out interference with the nation’s 
war aims and the tools of military mobilization, including industrial 
production and conscription.28  The Committee on Public Information 
had worked to boost support for the war effort, while Congress dutifully 
enacted legislation to criminalize opposition.29  From the outset, such 
laws were invoked not only against pro-German propaganda but also 
against the disaffected radicals who regarded the conflict as a 
concession to Wall Street profiteers.30  Although officials brushed off 
allegations that they were “us[ing] the war as a means to crush labor,”31 
critics were quick to point out how many of the most prominent 
Espionage Act prosecutions had targeted radical defendants.  The 
 
 25 For a comprehensive account of the trial, see POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 82–117.  
A seventh defendant and friend of Abrams’s, Gabriel Prober, was not involved in printing 
or distributing the leaflets and was found not guilty.  
 26 On the Supreme Court’s decision, see generally POLENBERG, supra note 2; THOMAS 
HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—AND CHANGED 
THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA (2013). 
 27 See The Red Hysteria, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 28, 1920, at 249–53.  See generally Laura 
Weinrib, Against Intolerance: The Red Scare Roots of Legal Liberalism, 18 J. GILDED AGE & 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 7 (2019). 
 28 See CHRISTOPHER CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF 
THE MODERN AMERICAN CITIZEN 7–11 (2008); DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD 
WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 45–59 (1980). 
 29 On the Committee on Public Information, see ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICA’S GREAT 
WAR: WORLD WAR I AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 78–84 (2000); see also STEPHEN VAUGHN, 
HOLDING FAST THE INNER LINES: DEMOCRACY, NATIONALISM, AND THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC 
INFORMATION (1980).  
 30 The targets included socialists and the Industrial Workers of the World (“IWW”).  
See, for example, MICHAEL KAZIN, WAR AGAINST WAR: THE AMERICAN FIGHT FOR PEACE,  
1914–1918 (2017); C. ROLAND MARCHAND, THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND SOCIAL 
REFORM, 1889–1918 244–48 (1972); JAMES WEINSTEIN, THE DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN AMERICA, 
1912–1925 ch. 3 (1967). 
 31 Resolution, in Am. Civil Liberties Union Records, The Roger Baldwin Years,  
1917–1950 vol. 3, 109 [hereinafter ACLU Papers] (on file with Princeton University 
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Public Policy Papers). 
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casualties included practically the entire leadership of the Industrial 
Workers of the World (“IWW”), along with socialists Charles Schenck 
and Eugene V. Debs.32   
With few exceptions, convictions under the wartime legislation 
were practically pro forma.33  One of the first important cases raised 
hopes among radical defendants that judges might exercise moderation.  
When the Postmaster General attempted to shut down The Masses, a 
respected socialist magazine, the Civil Liberties Bureau of the American 
Union Against Militarism (AUAM) organized a defense fund, and lawyer 
Gilbert Roe represented the publication and its staff.34  Antiwar activists 
and radical dissenters were heartened when Judge Learned Hand 
decided, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that suppressing The 
Masses because of its antiwar editorials and political cartoons exceeded 
the authority conferred on postal officials under the Espionage Act.35  
Eschewing the oft-invoked “bad tendency” test that held speakers 
accountable under the wartime legislation for statements likely to lead 
to prohibited conduct, Judge Hand would have required direct 
incitement to violation of the law as a condition of conviction under the 
statute.36  Encouraged by his opinion, the Civil Liberties Bureau (which 
soon reorganized as the National Civil Liberties Bureau (NCLB) and 
would eventually become the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)) 
launched a national network of lawyers willing to represent defendants 
in Espionage Act and conscription cases.37  In November, however, the 
 
 32 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 
U.S. 211 (1919).  On the suppression of the IWW and socialists, see MELVYN DUBOFSKY, WE 
SHALL BE ALL: A HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF THE WORLD 376–97, 438–531 (1969); 
WILLIAM PRESTON JR., ALIENS AND DISSENTERS: FEDERAL SUPPRESSION OF RADICALS, 1903–1933 
88–117 (1963). 
 33 The few exceptions include Judges George M. Borquin and Charles Fremont 
Amidon.  There were also some early victories under the Trading with the Enemy Acts 
as well as local ordinances and state laws.  On the whole, however, judges capitulated to 
popular pressures.  See PAUL L. MURPHY, WORLD WAR I AND THE ORIGIN OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
THE UNITED STATES 179–247 (1979); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Origins of the “Bad Tendency” 
Test: Free Speech in Wartime, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 411, 415–19 (2002).  
 34 The Masses was edited by Max Eastman, whose sister, Crystal Eastman, had served 
as executive secretary of the American Union Against Militarism and was a co-founder 
of the National Civil Liberties Bureau. 
 35 Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 (2d 
Cir. 1917).  Judge Hand’s opinion in Masses does not contain the terms “First 
Amendment” or “Constitution.”  
 36 On the Masses case, see GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 
(1994); Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975).   
 37 On the NCLB and early ACLU, see generally ROBERT C. COTTRELL, ROGER NASH 
BALDWIN AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2000); DONALD JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE TO 
AMERICAN FREEDOMS: WORLD WAR I AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
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Second Circuit reversed Judge Hand’s decision, and The Masses, which 
lost its second-class mailing privileges, had no choice except to shut 
down.38  Other courts proved equally obliging of the administration’s 
speech-suppressive agenda.  
Litigation under the Selective Service Act, passed in May 1917 
despite significant opposition, fared even worse.39  Officials were 
confident that “every possible legal contingency was cared for” and that 
a constitutional challenge to conscription was bound to fail.40  When the 
Supreme Court considered a spate of convictions under the statute in 
December, the Solicitor General deemed the defendants’ claims 
“frivolous” and thought it practically unnecessary to “appear and refute 
them.”41  It was Harry Weinberger, future lawyer for the Abrams 
defendants, who represented famed anarchists Alexander Berkman and 
Emma Goldman in the conscription case.42  Weinberger was a pacifist 
and radical individualist who had worked closely with the prewar Free 
Speech League and categorically opposed state interference with 
personal liberties, from compulsory vaccination to birth control 
regulation.43  He was also an enthusiastic member of Goldman and 
Berkman’s No-Conscription League, which was organized in opposition 
to conscription on grounds of internationalism, anti-militarism, and 
anti-capitalism.44  
In the spring, Weinberger had approached future NCLB (and ACLU) 
co-founder Roger Baldwin to propose the creation of an American Legal 
Defense League to “fight all cases in the United States where free speech, 
free press or the right peaceably to assemble or to petition the 
 
(1963); SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU (1990); 
WEINRIB, supra note 11; JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES 
OF AMERICAN LAW ch. 3 (2007). 
 38 Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 39 (2d Cir. 1917). 
 39 Selective Service Act, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76 (1917); Espionage Act, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 
(1917).  See, e.g., Anti-Registration Pleas Are Ruled Out by Tuttle, July 11, 1917 
(newspaper clipping), in ACLU Papers, supra note 31, vol. 46; Broke Draft Law, Get Long 
Terms, N.Y. WORLD, Dec. 18, 1917, in ACLU Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 46; Detroit 
Socialist Given Year in Jail for Not Registering, N.Y. CALL, Nov. 25, 1917, in ACLU Papers, 
supra note 31, at vol. 46.  
 40 Doubts Court Test of the Draft Law, July 22, 1917 (newspaper clipping), in ACLU 
Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 43. 
 41 Argument Ended in Draft Appeals, N.Y. TRIB., Dec. 14, 1917. 
 42 Brief on Behalf of the Plaintiffs-in-Error at 25–78, Goldman and Berkman v. United 
States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (No. 702) (arguing that the “Draft Act is unconstitutional”). 
 43 See POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 75–78; WALKER, supra note 37, at 22.  On the Free 
Speech League, see generally RABBAN, supra note 8. 
 44 Transcript of Record at 114, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918) (No. 
656) (quoting Manifesto of the No-Conscription League (May 25, 1917)). 
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government is invaded.”45  Although Baldwin instead opted to build a 
new organization for the defense of personal rights within the AUAM,46 
Weinberger’s advice helped to shape the agenda of the NCLB and 
constitutional litigation under the wartime legislation more broadly.  
Weinberger believed that the publication of pamphlets critical of the 
government and military practices was protected by the First 
Amendment,47 and he was determined to “re-educate the people, that 
they have the right to discuss and the right to oppose conscription and 
ask for its repeal.”48  The short-lived American Legal Defense League 
initially attracted support from notable progressives, along with the 
New Republic.49  Even the Secretary of War signaled acceptance, if not 
encouragement, of its program.50 
In practice, however, Weinberger’s legal arguments quickly 
alienated mainstream sympathizers.  Challenging the constitutionality 
of the Selective Service Act, he argued that the statute’s narrowly 
defined exemptions for particular religious sects violated the 
Establishment Clause and infringed on religious liberty by inhibiting 
individual religious choice.51  He went so far as to defend an anarchist’s 
right to refuse to register out of opposition to “uniformed murder” in a 
war “waged by governments,”52 insisting that “the protection of the 
Constitution . . . is guaranteed to all.”53  Predictably, such claims found 
little traction in the courts.  In the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Supreme 
Court “pass[ed] without anything but statement the proposition that an 
establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise 
thereof repugnant to the First Amendment resulted from the exemption 
clauses of the act,” because it considered the “unsoundness” of the 
 
 45 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger N. Baldwin (Apr. 28, 1917), in ACLU 
Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 35. 
 46 Letter from Roger N. Baldwin to Harry Weinberger (June 18, 1917), in ACLU 
Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 35. 
 47 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger N. Baldwin (Apr. 30, 1917), in ACLU 
Papers, supra note 31, at vol. 35. 
 48 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Joy Young (May 2, 1917), in ACLU Papers, supra 
note 31, at vol. 35. 
 49 See Defense of Free Speech, NEW REPUBLIC, May 12, 1917, at 54; The American Legal 
Defense League, NATION, May 31, 1917. 
 50 Secretary of War Denounces Military Rowdyism—Militarism the Same the World 
Over, LOCOMOTIVE FIREMEN & ENGINEMEN’S MAG., July 15, 1917, at 4 (quoting Letter from 
Newton Baker to Harry Weinberger). 
 51 Transcript of Record at 5–6, Kramer v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (No. 
681).  Among other claims, he argued that conscription violated the Thirteenth 
Amendment. 
 52 Id. at 23. 
 53 Id. at 34. 
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argument “too apparent to require” further discussion.54  In upholding 
the Selective Service Act, the Court stressed the expansive scope of 
federal powers when the nation was at war.  
Formidable as the existing tools of state-coerced conformity 
proved to be, authorities clamored for more.  In May 1918, Congress 
debated the infamous Sedition Act amendments to the Espionage Act.  
The Sedition Act directly prohibited “disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or 
abusive language about the form of Government of the United States,” 
along with the Constitution, the Armed Forces, and the American flag.55  
It also criminalized advocacy of “any curtailment of production in this 
country” of anything “necessary . . . to the prosecution of the war . . . with 
intent by such curtailment to cripple or hinder the United States in the 
prosecution of the war.”56  Violations of these provisions were 
punishable by twenty years in prison and a $10,000 fine.57  In contrast 
to other wartime measures, the bill provoked a spirited debate within 
and outside Congress.  Several legislators stressed the potential for 
bureaucratic overreach and even partisan abuse, especially in the 
absence of a statutory safe harbor for truthful criticism.  Nonetheless, 
the bill passed easily, and on May 16, President Wilson happily signed it 
into law.58  The Abrams defendants were acutely aware of the new “gag 
act” and the twenty-year prison term that attached to violations, as 
Mollie Steimer admitted to the officers who arrested her.59  In fact 
Lipman’s leaflet expressly “denounc[ed] German militarism” in what 
was presumably a conscious effort to escape liability under the statute.60   
As events unfolded, Lipman’s disclaimer proved woefully 
insufficient.  True, officials within the Department of Justice (belatedly) 
rejected the theory that criticizing the American intervention in Russia, 
 
 54 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389–90 (1918). 
 55 Sedition Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 On the terms of the Sedition Act and debate over its passage, see STONE, supra note 
8, at 183–91; JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 97–98; MURPHY, supra note 33, at 81, 98–103; 
and RABBAN, supra note 8, at 250–55.  
 59 See Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 83; Two Justices Refuse to Gag 
Pamphleteers, N.Y. CALL, Nov. 12, 1919 (referring to “gag act”).  Steimer was asked 
whether she knew “at the time [she] distributed these pamphlets that it was a violation 
of the law.”  Id.  She replied, “Yes, sir . . . I read in the newspapers that the Espionage Law 
had passed, and it said that anyone who attacked the United States or who speaks 
against the uniform of the United States Army or Navy [or] insults the President . . . 
would get twenty years in prison.”  Id.  Abrams, by contrast, testified that he “thought 
[he] broke no law,” because his criticism of the President was protected “under the 
constitutional right of free speech.”  Id. at 174. 
 60 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 17. 
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without more, was sufficient to constitute an Espionage Act violation.61  
At the same time, they were persuaded that Schwartz’s Yiddish 
pamphlet crossed the line by calling explicitly for a general strike to 
hamper military production.62  It did not help matters that Abrams 
presented a forged draft card when he was first apprehended, nor that 
several of the defendants possessed loaded revolvers.63  Among the 
many Espionage Act convictions eventually affirmed by the Supreme 
Court, the Abrams case was a poor bet to break the Court’s unanimity.  
The indictment against the Abrams defendants tracked the 
language of the Sedition Act.  Its first three counts charged the 
defendants with conspiring, while the United States was at war with 
Germany, “to unlawfully utter, print, write and publish,” first, “disloyal, 
scurrilous and abusive language about the form of Government of the 
United States”; second, “language ‘intended to bring the form of 
Government of the United States into contempt, scorn, contumely, and 
disrepute’”; and third, “language ‘intended to incite, provoke and 
encourage resistance to the United States in said war.’”64  The fourth 
count charged the defendants with conspiring “unlawfully and willfully, 
by utterance, writing, printing and publication, to urge, incite and 
advocate curtailment of production of . . . ordnance and ammunition” 
essential to the ongoing war.65  
Given the crowded docket in the Southern District of New York, the 
case was assigned to a visiting judge from Alabama, Henry DeLamar 
Clayton, Jr.  Although he was best known as sponsor of the Clayton 
Antitrust Act, with its conspicuous exemption for organized labor, Judge 
Clayton was an unfortunate selection for the Abrams defendants.  An 
unabashed white supremacist, he despised revolutionaries and German 
sympathizers in equal measure.66  He was also decidedly unlikely to 
accept Weinberger’s invitation to invalidate the Sedition Act on First 
Amendment grounds.  Judge Clayton believed courts “could not make 
the law,” but rather were “bound by its limitations.”67  At the same time, 
he was unsympathetic to attacks on judicial review, and he rejected 
prewar efforts to limit judicial power through the “recall of judges and 
 
 61 POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 74. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 48–49.  
 64 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S 616, 617 (1919). 
 65 Id.  The complete indictment appears at Transcript of Record, supra note 1,  
at 2–15. 
 66 On Clayton, see POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 95–104, and Paul M. Pruitt, Jr., Henry 
D. Clayton: Plantation Progressive on the Federal Bench, in PAUL M. PRUITT & GUY W. HUBBS, 
ED., TAMING ALABAMA: LAWYERS AND REFORMERS, 1804–1929 (2010). 
 67 Henry D. Clayton, Popularizing Administration of Justice, 8 A.B.A. J. 43, 43 (1922).  
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judicial decisions” as misguided—though he thought that modest 
reform directed toward making the law less technical and more 
accessible would block the spread, and perhaps even “wholly destroy[],” 
the twin scourges of Bolshevism and socialism that the war had 
unleashed on America.68  Predictably, Judge Clayton denied 
Weinberger’s motions to dismiss the indictments on the grounds that 
the Espionage Act was unconstitutionally vague and inconsistent with 
the First Amendment.69  On October 14, a jury was empaneled, and 
United States v. Abrams went to trial.  
From Harry Weinberger’s perspective, the trial offered several 
important opportunities.  As with other wartime cases, Weinberger 
sought to impugn the constitutionality of the Espionage and Sedition 
acts and to promote the cause of free speech.  He likened the defendants 
to such martyrs to freedom as Socrates, John Brown, Elijah Lovejoy, and 
above all to Jesus70—a comparison that Abrams had drawn as well and 
which bothered Judge Clayton just as much as Abrams’s reference to his 
“forefathers” who had built America on revolution.71 
Yet to Weinberger, the Abrams trial was about much more than 
expressive freedom.  First and foremost, it was a chance to defend 
radical advocacy by “putting on the witness-stand men of national 
reputation” who would discredit American intervention in the Soviet 
Union.72  To that end, Weinberger hoped to elicit testimony from 
Raymond Robins, a former head of the American Red Cross in Russia, 
who believed that American intervention in the Soviet Union was 
premised on misinformation.  Weinberger planned to question Robins 
about the so-called “Sisson documents” purportedly linking Bolshevik 
Russia to the Kaiser, which Wilson invoked to justify the deployment of 
American troops (and which were widely disseminated by the 
Committee on Public Information).  Robins had been silenced by 
government officials; subpoenaed to testify in court, he would have had 
no choice but to acknowledge publicly his conviction that the documents 
 
 68 Id.  
 69 At trial and in his briefs, Weinberger argued that the Sedition Act was 
unconstitutional because it was “too uncertain and inexact as to what act or acts are 
prohibited by it.”  Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 260.  Vagueness claims had been 
pursued with some success in other contexts, and Alexander Bickel would later praise 
vagueness doctrine for its deference to the legislative process.  See Alexander M. Bickel, 
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 63 
(1961).  Perhaps, had the Court accepted Weinberger’s argument, 1920s progressives 
might have endorsed it for the same reason, but the Court declined the invitation.   
 70 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 21–24.  
 71 See Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 194. 
 72 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 12.  
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were forgeries.73  Weinberger hoped the revelation would embarrass 
the Wilson administration and erode support for America’s military 
presence in Russia, but his aspirations in that regard were thwarted.  
Judge Clayton cut off all questioning about the legality and wisdom of 
President Wilson’s decision to dispatch troops to Siberia.74  
For Weinberger, the Abrams trial was also an occasion to build 
support for a general amnesty of all individuals convicted under the 
wartime legislation.  To that end, he drew attention to officials’ 
aggressive investigative methods.  The so-called third degree was a 
staple of interrogation in early twentieth-century New York, and the 
defendants had described the use of chilling tactics, “from tearing the 
hair to pulling the tongue; from black-jacks to the leg of a chair.”75  In 
early September, Schwartz had written in a letter that the arrest “could 
be compared with the Spanish Inquisition and the blackest pages of 
man’s brutality to man.”76  Weinberger sought repeatedly to elicit 
corroborating testimony from the officers,77 but all denied engaging in 
abuse.78  
Weinberger also provided the defendants a platform for explaining 
their actions and aspirations, along with their economic theories.  
Abrams admitted to being a “revolutionist” and forthrightly declared 
that he did not “believe in government.”79  Mollie Steimer, a “youthful 
and diminutive radical” who (according to the New York Times) defied 
“all laws and authorities,”80 testified extensively and unabashedly about 
the ills of capitalist exploitation.  She baldly declared that she did not 
“believe in such laws” as the Sedition Act and was “trying to defeat” 
them.81  As for the probable effect of a general strike in the munitions 
factory on the prosecution of the war against Germany, she answered 
only that she “cared nothing about interfering with the war with 
Germany, because it does not matter to me.”82   
 
 73 See POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 108–16. 
 74 He allowed Weinberger to read his questions into the record but did not permit 
the witness to answer them.  See Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 123–33.  
 75 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 11 (quoting Letter from 
Jacob Schwartz to Dear Comrades (Sept. 5, 1918)). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Five Bolsheviki Guilty, One Freed of Attacking U.S., N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1918, at 14. 
 78 Polenberg concludes that the anarchists’ accounts of the abuse, which were 
reported immediately and were internally consistent, were likely accurate.  POLENBERG, 
supra note 2, at 67–68. 
 79 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 164.  
 80 Sentences of Mollie Steimer and Three Co-Plotters Cut to 2½ Years by President, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1921. 
 81 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 219. 
 82 Id. at 222. 
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In short, it was evident from the outset that the “five Bolsheviki,” as 
the New York Tribune called the defendants, had “scant hope of 
acquittal.”83  That was especially true in light of Judge Clayton’s 
demeanor in conducting the trial, an issue that attracted considerable 
attention from scholars and advocates in the coming months.  Clayton 
suggested to the jury that the defendants’ secrecy betokened illicit 
intentions, and he intimated that conviction would be appropriate on 
the basis of their testimony alone.84  The New York Tribune reported that 
Abrams’s testimony “so aroused the court that Judge Clayton conducted 
a cross-examination of his own.”85 He interrupted, spoke over, and 
ridiculed the witnesses, according to the prosecution-friendly New York 
Times.86  
Against this backdrop, the swift convictions of the Abrams 
defendants were unremarkable.  The jury deliberated for a little over an 
hour before finding Abrams, Steimer, Lachowsky, Lipman, and 
Rosansky guilty on all four counts.87  Given the rate of convictions in 
Espionage Act cases, neither Weinberger nor the defendants could have 
considered the verdict surprising; convictions were routinely obtained 
for much milder remarks under the much narrower provisions of the 
original Espionage Act.88  More jarring, however, were the unusually 
long sentences that Clayton meted out.  In exchange for cooperating 
with the government, Rosansky received only three years in prison.  The 
others were sentenced to twenty, except Steimer who, in an apparently 
paternalistic concession to her gender, received only fifteen.89  Like his 
fellow defendants, Lipman professed to welcome the news.  He 
expressed his hope that the trial would “go on record as a trial not of the 
United States Government against five individuals, but as a trial of 
 
 83 Five Bolsheviki Guilty, One Freed of Attacking U.S., N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1918. 
 84 See, e.g., Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 237. (“It is perhaps not amiss for 
me to say that men who are actuated by pure and lawful motives as a rule act in the open 
daylight. . . . So it is proper for you to consider how these leaflets were printed and how 
they were circulated, as bearing upon the question of the intent that animated these 
defendants in the circulation of those leaflets.”).  
 85 Thousands of Anarchists Here Still Active, Defendant Asserts, N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 22, 
1918.  See also Chafee, supra note 5, at 756 (“[I]t is one of the remarkable features of this 
case that most of the cross-examination of the prisoners was not by the district attorney 
but by the court . . . .”).  
 86 Bolshevist Witness Curbed by Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1918. 
 87 Five Bolsheviki Guilty, One Freed of Attacking U.S., N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1918.  The jury 
acquitted Prober, whom the government had failed to link to the distribution of the 
pamphlets.  Id.  See generally Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 240. 
 88 For representative examples, see STONE, supra note 8, at 171–73. 
 89 See Mollie Steimer and 3 Youths to Be Released, N.Y. CALL, Oct. 16, 1921; see also 
Prison Terms for the Bolsheviki, N.Y. TRIB., Oct. 26, 1918 (“The sentences are the most 
severe inflicted in this district since the United States entered the war.”).  
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Capitalism against Labor.”90  Indeed, he applauded the convictions for 
revealing the intolerance of American officials and institutions and 
thereby hastening the revolution.  “The more Espionage Acts you pass, 
the more the lovers of truth you put in prison,” he predicted, “the nearer 
will be the end of poverty, misery, starvation, autocracy, despotism and 
tyranny.”91  
Clayton made clear his view that the defendants “deserve[d]” their 
harsh sentences.92  Still, he thought it possible that if they “behave[d] 
themselves” there might be “Executive intervention at Washington, and 
then deportation following Executive intervention.”93  In the end, that is 
precisely what happened, though without the good behavior.  Pending 
appeal, Weinberger raised and posted bail for the defendants 
(poignantly, he paid in Liberty Bonds).94 True to form, the defendants 
devoted the months before their prison terms commenced to radical 
agitation.95   
II.  THE RED SCARE REINVENTION OF RIGHTS  
Well before the Abrams case arrived in the Supreme Court, Harry 
Weinberger was actively framing its narrative.  And in the estimation of 
the Political Prisoners Defense and Relief Committee, he “succeeded in 
giving their case a national, and even international, significance.”96  In 
part, he sought to deploy the conviction in his longstanding campaign to 
establish that “[t]he right to speak and the right to publish and distribute 
pamphlets on the war is an absolute one under the constitution.”97  Legal 
vindication of that theory, however, was only one component of the 
struggle.  Weinberger had long thought “fine spun legal argument on the 
Espionage Bill” to be less important than “re-educat[ing] the people.”98  
 
 90 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 30.  
 91 Id. 
 92 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 243.  
 93 Id. at 244.  
 94 Doubly Liberty Bonds, N.Y. WORLD, Nov. 16, 1918.  
 95 See POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 177–78. The defendants were subject to extensive 
surveillance while they were out on bail, and Steimer repeatedly clashed with law 
enforcement.  See id. at 177–88.  Abrams and Lachowsky attempted to leave the country 
after the Supreme Court issued its decision but were apprehended in New Orleans 
aboard a ship bound for Mexico.  Id. at 242–46.  Steimer, who in any case opposed bail 
jumping, was in jail at the time for a subsequent offense.  Id. at 247. 
 96 POLITICAL PRISONERS DEF. & RELIEF COMM., supra note 5, at 8. 
 97 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Roger Baldwin (Apr. 28, 1917), in ACLU Papers, 
supra note 31, at vol 35.  
 98 Letter from Harry Weinberger to Joy Young (May 2, 1917), in ACLU Papers, supra 
note 31, at vol. 35.  
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In that broader effort, legal defeats were every bit as instructive as legal 
victories.99  
Indeed, by the time Judge Clayton dispensed the sentences in 
United States v. Abrams, prominent legal defeats like the Masses case had 
begun to chip away at the complacency about wartime repression that 
had characterized the first year of the war.  Early on, most Americans 
had either actively embraced wartime censorship as a cost of a 
successful war effort or had accepted it as a concession to majoritarian 
democracy.  Conservatives had always allowed for a great deal of 
censorship in the service of public safety and morals; liberty of speech, 
they insisted, did not encompass license.100  Progressives, meanwhile, 
considered open debate to be essential to social and scientific progress, 
but they counseled deference to democratically enacted laws, and they 
were willing to suspend the enjoyment of individual rights for the 
duration of the war.  As Karl Llewellyn put the point in reflecting on the 
Abrams case, “[o]ne is willing to endure silence, as he is to suffer taxes 
or the reek and mud of the field, that war may pass and victory be 
gained.”101 
These positions were closely linked to the respective contingents’ 
attitudes toward the judiciary and judicial review.  Conservatives 
venerated the courts as the “citadel of civil liberty,” by which they meant 
the institution best equipped to insulate the rights of private property 
against populist redistribution.102  At the same time, although they 
accepted that other individual rights were also essential to the 
constitutional design, they were concerned with preserving law and 
order and believed that radical agitation crossed the line.103  For their 
part, progressives were deeply skeptical of the courts and of the 
constitutional rights they purported to enforce.  After all, the courts had 
 
 99 The NLCB had voiced precisely that sentiment in an early pamphlet.  National Civil 
Liberties Bureau, The Need of a National Defense Fund (Nov. 15, 1917), in ACLU Papers, 
supra note 31, at vol. 25 (noting that judicial defeats could “show up miscarriage of 
justice” and thereby stimulate change).  
 100 See, e.g., Editorials: Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech, 5 VA. L. REG. N.S. 712, 
715–16 (1920) (“‘Freedom of speech’ as contemplated by our Constitution was no more 
intended to allow ‘unlicensed speech’ than the clause which permitted every citizen to 
bear arms was intended to allow the carrying of concealed weapons.”).  
 101 K.N.L., Free Speech in Time of Peace, 29 YALE L.J. 337, 340 (1920). 
 102 Walter George Smith, Civil Liberty in America, Address by Walter George Smith, 4 
A.B.A. J. 551, 562 (1918).  
 103 On the conservative civil liberties movement during the 1910s and 1920s, see 
GRABER, supra note 8, at 19–46.  See also DAVID BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: 
DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 3–7 (2011); KENNETH I. KERSCH, 
CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–2, 11–17, 21 (2004).  
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invoked the Constitution to invalidate many of progressives’ most 
celebrated legislative accomplishments, from workers’ compensation to 
the minimum wage.104  The same month that Harry Weinberger argued 
the Selective Draft Law Cases before the Supreme Court, a decision in a 
high profile labor case prompted the progressive New Republic to reflect 
that “a majority of the Supreme Court are endeavoring to enforce their 
own reactionary views of public policy, in direct opposition to the more 
enlightened views prevailing in legislatures and among the public.”105 
As a radical individualist who defended anarchists, Weinberger’s 
beliefs aligned almost as awkwardly with progressives’ views as they 
did with conservatives’ views.  Over the course of the war, however, 
progressives began to reevaluate their position on free speech and 
eventually even constitutional rights, if not the judiciary as an 
institution.  The trajectory is neatly captured by the ruminations of the 
philosopher John Dewey in the New Republic.106  In September 1917, he 
denied the prospect of widespread suppression and relished the irony 
of “ultra-socialists rallying to the . . .  sanctity of individual rights and 
constitutional guaranties.”107  Two months later, as the scope of 
government repression became increasingly indisputable, Dewey 
revised his position.  He declined to embrace individual autonomy, but 
he endorsed wartime tolerance by reference to pluralism and the social 
good.108  Zechariah Chafee Jr. would make much the same move in the 
spring of 1919 in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, in an article that 




 104 On progressives’ hostility toward the courts and rights-based constitutionalism, 
see, for example, ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 3–5 (1994); WILLIAM 
E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 2, 8 (1991); MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 4–6 (1992); WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR 
UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 1–2, 12–21 (1994); Laura Kalman, In Defense of 
Progressive Legal Historiography, 36 L. & HIST. REV. 1021, 1021, 1024, 1032, 1034 (2018); 
Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVS. AM. HIST. 113, 114, 117, 126 
(1982).  
 105 Breaking the Labor Truce, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 1917, at 197 (discussing 
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917)). 
 106 On Dewey’s about-face, see GRABER, supra note 8, at 98; KENNEDY, supra note 28,  
at 50–53, 90–92; RABBAN, supra note 8, at 243–45; and ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY 
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 202–12 (1991). 
 107 John Dewey, Conscription of Thought, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1917, at 128–30.  
 108 John Dewey, In Explanation of Our Lapse, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 3, 1917, at 17–18. 
 109 See Zechariah Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 937 
(1919).   
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Chafee’s may have been the most sustained and significant defense 
of free speech in the months before Abrams was decided, but its 
sentiment found considerable company among Holmes’s admirers and 
interlocutors.110  The impetus for a broad-based reconsideration of 
progressive attitudes was the persistence of censorship after the war 
ended.  In November 1918, just weeks after the Abrams trial concluded, 
the armistice halted the fighting in Europe.  It did not, however, ease 
domestic repression.  Instead, the coercive apparatus of the state 
retrained explicitly on the radicals and revolutionaries who had always 
been its most frequent targets.111 The reorientation began even before 
the cessation of hostilities.  In October, Congress modified existing 
immigration laws to authorize the removal of any alien who was 
discovered to have espoused anarchist views at any time since entering 
the country.112  With the armistice, the Selective Service and Sedition 
acts elapsed, but a few pending prosecutions under the Espionage Act 
continued, and efforts to repeal the statute were unsuccessful.113  
To win the “war to end all wars,” progressives had seen the 
suspension of free speech as a worthwhile tradeoff.  It helped that 
industry, too, was asked to sacrifice for the nation’s cause—that 
business leaders feebly complained that their own “civil liberty” was 
under assault.114  With the armistice, that precarious equilibrium was 
unsettled.  Wilson had “unshackled” industry, Gilbert Roe reflected in 
December, “but the embargo on ideas remain[ed].”115  In short, the 
wartime exigencies that so impressed Justice Holmes when Schenck v. 
United States was argued in January, and which he would stress in his 
March 1919 decision, were becoming increasingly remote.116  
 
 110 For Holmes’s conversations and correspondence with Chafee, Learned Hand, 
Howard Laski, and Felix Frankfurter, among others, see RABBAN, supra note 8,  
at 299–353; HEALY, supra note 26; STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN 
WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS 365–95 (2019). 
 111 See generally ROBERT K. MURRAY, RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919–1920 
(1955). 
 112 See Immigration Act of 1918, ch. 186, 39 Stat. 889. 
 113 Gilbert E. Roe, Repeal the Espionage Law: An Address Delivered Before the Civic 
Club of New York (December 3, 1918), in DIAL, Jan. 11, 1919, at 8, 10 (“Who, when 
exercising arbitrary power, ever proposes to repeal the law which silences criticism of 
the manner in which such power is exercised?”). 
 114 See, e.g., Walter George Smith, Civil Liberty in America, 41 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 209, 
218–20 (1918). 
 115 Roe, supra note 113, at 8. 
 116 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“When a nation is at war, many things that might be said 
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured 
so long as men fight, and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right.”).  
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To be sure, there were salient differences between the progressive 
defense of free speech and the alternative preferred by Weinberger and 
his clients.  The latter imagined unfettered speech as a pathway to 
radical social and economic transformation; the former considered it 
the best tool for preventing revolution.  The Nation was typical in 
blaming censorship for “turning the thoughtful working people of the 
country into dangerous radicals and extreme direct actionists.”117  
Stressing the editors’ rejection of socialism, the journal endorsed an 
individual’s “right to present for public consideration his ideas, no 
matter how erroneous they may appear.”118  By the same token, Karl 
Llewellyn cautioned that “[r]epression of expression has in the past 
meant disorder,” and that “stern repression, long-continued, has meant 
revolution.”119  Even President Wilson professed always to have 
“believe[d] that the greatest freedom of speech was the greatest 
safety.”120  Whatever his own beliefs, Weinberger played to this concern 
in his brief to the Supreme Court.  The suppression of truthful 
discussion, he warned, would “only drive people to underground 
propaganda.”121  
The notion that free speech might defuse radical pressures became 
an increasingly common trope as mounting labor unrest coupled with 
the specter of revolutionary violence abroad raised new concerns about 
domestic militancy.  During the war, the American Federation of Labor 
(AFL) (in contrast to the more radical contingents of the American labor 
movement) had experienced a boom in membership and, in light of 
labor shortages resulting from foreign deployment of American troops, 
in political and economic power.122  In November 1918, however, 
Republicans took control of both chambers of Congress, and the Wilson 
administration shifted its favor from labor to industry.  Soldiers 
returned to work, and the corresponding labor surplus spurred unions 
to adopt more aggressive tactics.  Increased cost of living exacerbated 
 
 117 Danger Ahead, NATION, Feb. 8, 1919, at 186. 
 118 Id. at 186–877. 
 119 K.N.L., supra note 101, at 343.   
 120 WOODROW WILSON, America Is Ready, in THE TRIUMPH OF IDEALS: SPEECHES, MESSAGES 
AND ADDRESSES MADE BY THE PRESIDENT BETWEEN FEBRUARY 24, 1919, AND JULY 8, 1919 70, 78 
(1919). 
 121 Brief for Plaintiffs-in-Error at 24, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) 
(No. 316).  
 122 See JOSEPH A. MCCARTIN, LABOR’S GREAT WAR: THE STRUGGLE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
AND THE ORIGINS OF MODERN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS, 1912–1921 174 (1997).  On the 
labor-friendly agenda of the National War Labor Board, see MELVYN DUBOFSKY, THE STATE 
& LABOR IN MODERN AMERICA 72 (1994); see also DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE 
OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865–1925 442–46 
(1987). 
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complaints about economic inequality.  Anti-immigrant sentiment 
escalated, and race riots roiled the nation.123  
Most pertinent for the Abrams defendants, concerns about 
anarchist violence—as well as public support for suppression—reached 
a fever pitch in the spring of 1919 when bombs were mailed to public 
officials and other prominent figures.124  The radical press denied 
responsibility, but a leaflet found on the scene was signed “The 
Anarchist Fighters.”125  The new General Intelligence Division of the 
Bureau of Investigation, under the leadership of the young J. Edgar 
Hoover, undertook aggressive surveillance of suspected subversives.126  
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, who had been targeted in the 
second series of bombings, took full advantage of his power under the 
new immigration laws to deport foreign-born radicals, including Emma 
Goldman and Alexander Berkman, along with Samuel Lipman’s 
“sweetheart.”127  
Congress, too, played its part.  The Senate’s Overman Committee, 
initially appointed to investigate pro-German activity among beer 
brewers, quickly shifted its focus to the Bolshevik threat.128  Its June 
1919 report unselfconsciously denounced Bolshevism for abrogating 
freedom of speech and for erecting a “dictatorship of [a] small 
minority.”129  Majoritarian repression, by contrast, posed no apparent 
threat to democracy.  Indeed, New York’s Joint Committee to Investigate 
Seditious Activities, or Lusk Committee, convened in March for the 
express purpose of “repression carried on by and with the consent of 
the vast majority.”130  Under the guidance of well-known lawyer and 
Red-hunter Archibald Stevenson, who had also testified before the 
Overman Committee, the Lusk Committee would soon assemble 
comprehensive reports on the Abrams defendants.131  Notably, 
 
 123 MONTGOMERY, supra note 122, at 388–89. 
 124 See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 78–80. 
 125 See PAUL AVRICH, SACCO AND VANZETTI: THE ANARCHIST BACKGROUND 137–38 (1991).  
 126 See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 77–80, 193–200; see also STANLEY COBEN, A. MITCHELL 
PALMER: POLITICIAN 215–21 (1963). 
 127 3 Russians on Way to Prison Under Gag Act, N.Y. CALL, Dec. 27, 1919 (referring to 
Ethel Bernstein).   
 128 See MURRAY, supra note 111, at 226–29.  On the Overman Committee, see REGIN 
SCHMIDT, RED SCARE: FBI AND THE ORIGINS OF ANTICOMMUNISM IN THE UNITED STATES,  
1919–1943 136–46 (2000). 
 129 BREWING AND LIQUOR INTERESTS AND GERMAN AND BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA, S. DOC. NO. 66-
62, at 31, 36 (1919).  
 130 POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 170.  On New York’s Lusk Committee, see TODD J. 
PFANNESTIEL, RETHINKING THE RED SCARE: THE LUSK COMMITTEE AND NEW YORK’S CRUSADE 
AGAINST RADICALISM, 1919–1923 (2003).  
 131 POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 171–72. 
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Stevenson believed the greatest danger to American institutions came 
from “those quasi-political and economic organizations which teach that 
the workers should organize into revolutionary industrial unions for the 
purpose of using the coercive power of the general strike as a means to 
enable an organized minority . . . to impose its will upon the American 
people.” 132   
Stevenson’s preoccupation with the general strike—the same 
method that the Abrams defendants had pressed in their pamphlets—
was not entirely outlandish.  The Seattle General Strike of February 
1919 prompted frenzied denunciations of worker radicalism and its 
threat to political and economic stability.133  It was followed in the 
summer and the fall by a massive strike wave involving four million 
American workers, including the Boston police.134  The AFL, which had 
largely capitulated to wartime censorship of antiwar speech, “insist[ed] 
that all restrictions of freedom of speech, press, public assembly, 
association and travel be completely removed.”135  But its decades-old 
effort to recast picketing and boycotts as constitutionally protected 
expression continued to ring hollow.136  Federal troops helped to 
suppress the steel strike, and the administration obtained a federal 
injunction against striking coal miners.137  Rather than take seriously 
their efforts to bargain for better wages, hours, and working conditions, 
employers and the mainstream newspapers denounced the strikers as 
a mix of foreign-born Bolsheviks and their unwitting dupes.138  The same 
progressives who had accepted enforced conformity as the price of 
defeating the Kaiser doubted the veracity of the Bolshevik threat.  
Strikers’ revolutionary ambitions struck them as a pretext as opposed 
to a legitimate peril.  As Swinburne Hale observed for the New Republic, 
officials who claimed to be policing “force and violence” were in fact 
arresting prospective strikers because “they advocated the general 
strike.”139 
 
 132 Archibald E. Stevenson, The World War and Freedom of Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
1921, at 33 (reviewing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920)).   
 133 Id.  On the Seattle general strike see ROBERT L. FRIEDHEM, THE SEATTLE GENERAL STRIKE 
(1964). 
 134 DUBOFSKY, supra note 122, at 76–79.  
 135 Resolution No. 108 Adopted by the Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, Atlantic City, June 1919, in ACLU Papers, supra note 31, 
at vol. 69.  On the AFL, free speech, and anti-Communism during World War I and the 
Red Scare, see JENNIFER LUFF, COMMONSENSE ANTICOMMUNISM: LABOR AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 
BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 46–80 (2012). 
 136 See generally Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). 
 137 See DAVID BRODY, LABOR IN CRISIS: THE STEEL STRIKE OF 1919 60–77 (1965). 
 138 MURRAY, supra note 111, at 135–65.  
 139 Swinburn Hale, The Force and Violence Joker, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 21, 1920, at 231. 
WEINRIB (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:29 PM 
82 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:61 
Such were the conditions when Harry Weinberger appeared in 
Washington at the end of October for oral argument in Abrams v. United 
States, and when the Supreme Court issued its decision just three weeks 
later.  Weinberger pressed essentially the same arguments he had 
introduced at the trial: the evidence of unlawful activity was insufficient, 
and the relevant provisions of the Espionage Act were, in any case, 
unconstitutional.  His brief conceded that the leaflets were 
“intemperate” and “inflammatory.”140  Those were incautious adjectives, 
given Justice Holmes’s propensity for fire metaphors in wartime speech 
cases.  But the thrust of the argument was straightforward.  The 
defendants had engaged in a “public discussion of a public policy in 
reference to a country with which we were not at war.”141  Under the 
circumstances, conviction was unwarranted under the wartime 
legislation and incompatible with the protections of the First 
Amendment.  
Both the majority opinion and Justice Holmes’s storied dissent, 
joined by Justice Brandeis, are discussed at length elsewhere in this 
symposium and an impressive body of prior scholarship.  A few points 
nonetheless bear emphasis.  First, the majority opinion devoted little 
attention to the defendants’ constitutional claims, which were argued 
(in the Court’s assessment) “somewhat faintly” and which were 
“definitively negatived” in the Court’s recent decisions.142  Second, 
because the sentences might have been lawfully imposed under any 
count of the indictment, the majority had only to find the evidence 
sufficient to sustain any one of the four counts.143  Accordingly, it did not 
need to resolve whether a “technical distinction” might be made 
between disloyal and abusive language directed to the “form of our 
government” as opposed to government officials.144  That the two had 
been conflated was a central contention at trial and on appeal.  As 
anarchists, Abrams, Steimer, and Lachowsky surely rejected the 
American form of government, but the printed pamphlets (in contrast 
to other materials found among the defendants’ belongings) did not say 
so.  Lipman testified that as a socialist, he “believe[d] in government,” 
 
 140 Brief for Plaintiffs-in-Error, supra note 121, at 19.  Holmes’s references to fire 
include Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The most stringent protection 
of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater . . . .”); and 
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209 (1919) (“[I]t is impossible to say that it 
might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little 
breath would be enough to kindle a flame . . . .”).  
 141 Brief for Plaintiffs-in-Error, supra note 121, at 19. 
 142 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618–19 (1919).  
 143 Id. at 619. 
 144 Id. at 623–24. 
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albeit the “proper,” “not capitalistic” kind.145  The defendants stressed 
repeatedly that the pamphlets denounced the president and his policies, 
not American democracy.  Concededly, the pamphlets also criticized 
American capitalism—but that, as Zechariah Chafee observed, was an 
economic rather than “political structure.”146  As Kate Claghorn reflected 
in the Survey, equating an attack on capitalism with an attack on the 
American government “might be giving comfort to those who claim that 
the government and capitalism are one and the same thing.”147 
Whatever the majority might have made of these arguments, it did 
not decide whether the first two counts were sufficiently substantiated, 
nor whether the sections of the Sedition Act on which they relied were 
constitutional.  Instead, it decided only that there was ample evidence 
under the third and fourth counts.  The defendants sought change not 
“by candid discussion” but by “bringing upon the country the paralysis 
of a general strike, thereby arresting the production of all munitions and 
other things essential to the conduct of the war.”148  In the Court’s view, 
the “manifest purpose” of the pamphlets was to “defeat the war plans of 
the Government of the United States.”149  
It was with reference to these counts that Justice Holmes 
articulated in dissent his distinctive view of the intent required by the 
statute: “[W]hen words are used exactly,” as he concluded was true of 
the Sedition Act, “a deed is not done with intent to produce a 
consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the deed.”150  That is, 
“the aim to produce it” must be “the proximate motive of the specific 
act.”151  Holmes did not believe that Lipman’s English pamphlet, with its 
explicit disdain for German militarism, manifested any such purpose.  
Schwartz’s Yiddish leaflet, “if published for the purposes alleged in the 
fourth count,” could conceivably be punishable.152  It was not enough, 
however, to point to isolated phrases, divorced from their broader 
context.  Taken as a whole, Holmes concluded that “the only object of the 
 
 145 Transcript of Record, supra note 1, at 201; see also id. (“The entire leaflet speaks 
about capitalism and not government.”).  
 146 Chafee, supra note 5, at 753.  Chafee added that “our political structure . . . is 
compatible with other types of economic organization, such as national ownership of all 
industries.”  Id.  
 147 Kate Holladay Claghorn, Reassurance from the Supreme Court, SURVEY, Nov. 22, 
1919, at 148. 
 148 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 622 (1919). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 628. 
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paper [was] to help Russia and stop American intervention there,” not 
to impede the war against Germany.153   
As for the third count, the Sedition Act made it unlawful to “publish 
any language intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the 
United States,” and Holmes interpreted the statute to require “some 
forcible act of opposition to some proceeding of the United States in 
pursuance of the war.”154  Against that standard, he deemed the 
requisite specific intent to be lacking.  Even if he was “technically 
wrong,” he continued, “the most nominal punishment seems to me all 
that could possibly inflicted.”155  Anything else would amount to 
punishment for “the creed that they avow[ed].”156  And that, as Holmes 
went on to express so eloquently, would be inconsistent with “the 
theory of our Constitution.”157  
III.  FRAMING THE ABRAMS DISSENT 
Commentators were quick to label Holmes’s dissent a classic.158  Its 
memorable last paragraphs captured as only Holmes could the value of 
expressive freedom and the corresponding cost of censorship.159  
“Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical,” Holmes famously began.  “If you have no doubt of your premises 
or your power, and want a certain result with all your heart, you 
naturally express your wishes in law, and sweep away all opposition.”160  
Given the urgency of the war effort, it was no wonder that public officials 
and popular opinion had formed a phalanx of suppression.  But Holmes 
did not stop there.  “[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many 
fighting faiths,” he continued, “they may come to believe even more than 
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out.”161  Even such critics of the 
 
 153 Id. at 629. 
 154 Abrams, 205 U.S. at 617, 629. 
 155 Id. at 629. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 630. 
 158 E.g., The Call to Toleration, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 26, 1919, at 360. Notably, Holmes’s 
dissent in Lochner had failed to persuade a Supreme Court majority over the ensuing 
decades.  Progressives had reason to believe the Abrams dissent would suffer the same 
fate, even as it influenced debate among scholars and policymakers.  
 159 Abrams, 205 U.S. at 630. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
WEINRIB (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:29 PM 
2020] POWER AND PREMISES 85 
opinion as the antitrust attorney Henry Taft (brother of William Howard 
Taft) disdainfully acknowledged that Holmes’s “eloquent and inspiring, 
if irrelevant, discourse on the Freedom of Speech” had assumed 
“epochal importance.”162 
Yet the meaning of the opinion as a matter of constitutional law was 
undeniably murky.  Most legal scholars found both the majority and 
dissenting opinions to be ambiguous and the relationship between the 
two downright bewildering.  Thomas F. Carroll argued in the 
Georgetown Law Journal that “the real issue was concerned with the 
meaning of the word ‘intent,’” and “that the opinion of the Court in 
Espionage Act cases only indirectly involved the constitutionality of the 
Espionage Act.”163  To the extent the case involved the First Amendment 
at all, it seemed to “turn[] more upon the limitations of judicial 
legislation (by the process of construing) than upon the limitations on 
legislation by Congress.”164  That is, even if Holmes believed that 
constitutional law and policy should guide judicial interpretation of the 
Espionage Act, few imagined that he had erected the First Amendment 
as a barrier to congressional oversight in the domain of subversive 
speech.   
Assessments of Abrams in the law reviews were notable for their 
uncertainty.  Writing in the Yale Law Journal, Karl Llewellyn concluded 
that the majority had avoided passing on the constitutionality of the 
Sedition Act.  Given that Justice Clarke “neither agree[d] nor disagree[d] 
with the view of the First Amendment so cogently put forward in the 
dissent,” Llewellyn thought it possible (if not necessarily likely) that the 
case would someday “be explained as a mere disagreement on the 
interpretation of the particular facts involved.”165  In the Michigan Law 
Review, Thomas Reed Powell considered the dissent to be “difficult to 
deal with from the standpoint of constitutional law, as it does not make 
 
 162 Henry W. Taft, Freedom of Speech and Espionage Act, 55 AM. L. REV. 695, 707 
(1921); see also Editorials: Constitutional Law: Freedom of Speech, 5 VA. L. REG. 712,  
715–16 (1920) (“We regret to see that Judge Holmes dissented, though not surprised to 
find that Judge Brandeis did. . . . But Judge Holmes’ language in his dissenting opinion is 
so beautifully characteristic and eminently Bostonian that we are willing to allow him 
the greatest latitude.”).  
 163 Thomas F. Carroll, Evolution of the Theory of Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 
11 GEO. L. J. 27, 41 (1922–1923).  Writing three years after the decisions, Carroll 
concluded that “if Justice Holmes’ opinion were accepted, legislative discretion would 
be further curtailed in this respect by the Court than has been the case in previous 
instances.”  Id. 
 164 L.G.C., Comment on Recent Cases, 14 ILL. L. R. 598, 605 (1919–1920). 
 165 K.N.L., supra note 101, at 342–43. 
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clear how much it is based on the Constitution.”166  And John Wigmore, 
in a notoriously scathing critique of Holmes’s opinion, deemed its 
reasoning “so unclear that its exact point is difficult to gather.”167 
These ambivalent assessments of Justice Holmes’s reasoning raise 
the question of why the opinion was so widely celebrated.  It is my view 
that the dissent was influential not despite but because of its ambiguous 
constitutional analysis.  Because the majority did not rely on the 
Sedition Act’s categorical prohibitions on abusing the form of 
Government of the United States, neither the majority nor the dissent 
were forced to deal squarely with the constitutionality of those 
clauses.168  To Zechariah Chafee, the situation presented was precisely 
the one that Judge Hand had confronted in Masses Publishing Co. v. 
Patten.  “It is not a question of judicial refusal to enforce legislation,” 
Chafee reasoned, “but of giving it a construction which will not limit 
discussion beyond the express terms of the Act.”169  This posture meant 
that progressives could endorse the dissent in Abrams without 
confronting whether a reversal was constitutionally compelled, or even 
more controversially, whether it was appropriate for the Court to 
invalidate democratically enacted legislation.  As a result, enthusiastic 
support for Justice Holmes’s appeal to toleration masked deep-seated 
disagreement among supporters about constitutionalism and the 
courts.  
The Abrams dissent was an opinion written in and for its moment.  
It coincided with an erosion of progressive confidence in administrative 
expertise and the judgment of legislative majorities.170  Many of 
Holmes’s longtime admirers felt that the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
decisions in the spring 1919 Espionage Act cases had failed to account 
for the pathologies of majoritarian democracy and the dangers of 
 
 166 Thomas R. Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919–1920, 19 MICH. L. REV. 283, 291 
(1921). 
 167 John H. Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in 
War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. R. 539, 545 (1920). 
 168 Zechariah Chafee grasped this point and wrote that “the court did not have to 
declare the clauses involved in the third and fourth counts void.”  Chafee, supra note 5, 
at 770.  In fact, he presumed that “they are constitutional when construed in accordance 
with the First Amendment.”  Id.  
 169 Id.  
 170 On contemporary attitudes toward administrative power in the aftermath of 
World War I, see DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014); Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter, 
and the American Rechtstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. 
DEV. 171 (2009).  I explore the relationship between the erosion of progressive 
confidence in the administrative state and the emergence of free speech 
constitutionalism in Weinrib, supra note 27.  
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unbridled administrative discretion.  It was not that they doubted the 
legitimacy of state power, as their conservative counterparts did.  On the 
contrary, they believed that the increasing complexities of modern 
society required careful coordination by a robust administrative state.  
But, like Chafee, they came to see free speech as a necessary prerequisite 
for its prudent exercise.  The Abrams dissent gave voice to their renewed 
enthusiasm for open discussion.  At the same time, it was suitably vague 
about the role of the Constitution in constraining state power and, in 
turn, about the role of the courts in enforcing constitutional limitations.  
It was surely relevant both to Holmes’s analysis and to the popular 
reception of the case that the majority sustained the defendants’ 
conviction for advocacy of a general strike at a time when progressives 
were roundly condemning the deployment of government power to 
suppress the steel and coal strikes.  That issue took on increasing 
urgency in progressive circles during the fall of 1919.  In reporting on 
the coal and steel strikes, most progressive outlets were more 
sympathetic to the unions than toward the government officials who 
intervened on behalf of employers.171  Many considered the inequality 
of bargaining power between employees and employers to be 
incompatible with democracy and inconsistent with good economic 
policy.  They were also deeply skeptical of the claims that Bolsheviks 
were behind the strikes.172  
The link to Abrams was apparent.  The dominant reading of the 
Court’s decision, as one law bulletin put it, was that “urg[ing] 
curtailment of production . . . was the only one of the four counts upon 
which Justice Clarke for the majority seriously attempted to justify the 
verdict of the jury.”173  Abrams was the Court’s first encounter with the 
curtailment clause of the Sedition Act.  As a general matter, Clarke was 
relatively friendly toward organized labor and had evinced support for 
the right to picket and strike.174  In Abrams, however, he recognized the 
power of government to prohibit a call to strike—at least when that call 
was “circulated in the greatest port of our land, . . . in which great 
quantities of war supplies of every kind were at the time being 
manufactured for transportation overseas.”175  
The government had explicitly argued in its brief that the purpose 
of the proposed general strike was “not to improve the conditions of the 
 
 171 MURRAY, supra note 111, at 140. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Tully Nettleton, The Philosophy of Justice Holmes on Freedom of Speech, 3 SW. POL. 
SCI. Q. 287, 291 (1923).  
 174 POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 206.  
 175 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 622 (1919).  
WEINRIB (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:29 PM 
88 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:61 
employees either as to wages or hours of labor.”176  Still, the notion that 
urging workers to strike, absent what Holmes called a “strict and 
accurate” intent thereby to impede the war effort, was understandably 
distressing to the labor movement and its allies.177  It was also 
inconsistent with Holmes’s approach to labor cases,178 which had 
vaulted him to the status of progressive icon well before his dissent in 
Lochner v. New York.179  In contrast to most late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century judges, Holmes regarded organized labor as an 
acceptable counterweight to capital, and he had famously declined to 
impute malicious intent to striking workers.180  “The fact, that the 
immediate object of the act by which the benefit to themselves is to be 
gained is to injure their antagonist, does not necessarily make it 
unlawful,” he had reasoned in his 1896 dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner.181  
Not coincidentally, he had also rejected the majority’s assumption that 
striking workers necessarily issued “threats of force.”182  
Much of the early commentary on Abrams made the strike issue 
central.  Writing in the April 1920 Harvard Law Review, Chafee observed 
that “[s]trikes are not ordinarily illegal, and it would be startling if 
Congress intended to prohibit all incitement to them in war.”183  Instead, 
the “statute confined itself to strikes and similar measures that were 
specifically planned to interfere with the war.”184  Holmes’s friend and 
correspondent Sir Frederick Pollock similarly stressed this problem.  If 
intent were not defined narrowly, “every strike of workmen employed 
in producing anything of warlike use would be an act of resistance to the 
 
 176 Brief on Behalf of the United States at 35–36, Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 
616 (1919) (No. 316).  The purpose, according to the government, was “generally to 
prevent, at a most critical period of the war, the manufacture and shipment of 
munitions.”  Id.  
 177 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 178 Holmes later questioned in correspondence whether he was correct to conclude 
that evidence on the fourth count was insufficient.  POLENBERG, supra note 2, at 241.  
 179 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); HORWITZ, supra note 104, at 132.  
 180 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (1896) (“Combination on the one side is 
patent and powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable 
counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal way.”).  
 181 Id. at 1082.  
 182 Id. at 1080; see also Nettleton, supra note 173, at 300–01.  In Vegelahn, as 
presumably in Abrams, Holmes drew on the theory he had outlined in 1894 in Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).  See HORWITZ, 
supra note 104, at 131–36.   
 183 Chafee, supra note 5, at 767.  
 184 Id.  “If these defendants were guilty under the fourth count,” he explained, “so was 
every other person who advocated curtailment in the production of war essentials, no 
matter what his purpose.”  Id. at 768.  Chafee also argued that the call to a general strike 
was formulaic rather than genuine.  “We ought to hesitate a long while before we decide 
that Congress made such shop-worn exuberance criminal,” he argued.  Id. at 758.  
WEINRIB (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:29 PM 
2020] POWER AND PREMISES 89 
United States,” even if it were motivated by a dispute over wages and 
hours.185  
Of course, academic discussion of the Abrams dissent was never 
limited to the curtailing production count.  From the outset, the opinion 
was understood as an endorsement of open discussion.  As the failed 
coal and steel strikes receded from view—and as Holmes and Brandeis 
began dissenting in a broader range of speech cases—Holmes’s 
celebration of the free trade in ideas became a progressive rallying cry.  
In thinking better of his own earlier concessions to repression, 
Holmes was by no means aberrational.  True, a few lonely voices 
worried with progressive John Wigmore that the Court’s “parlor 
Bolsheviks” were abetting the circulation of violent propaganda in the 
name of “good-natured tolerance”—and indeed, that the risk was higher 
in peacetime, as the “forces of impatient fanaticism [were] let loose upon 
our constitutional government,” than it had been during the war.186  
Conservative lawyers, on the whole, shared Wigmore’s sense that the 
Supreme Court majority had helped to hold off a Bolshevik coup.  Many 
Americans, however, were losing their taste for suppression, and the 
Palmer Raids and the deportations that followed unleashed a flood of 
critical commentary.  In January, the New York Assembly’s refusal to 
seat lawfully elected socialists prompted widespread outrage, along 
with a public repudiation by Charles Evans Hughes on behalf of the New 
York Bar Association.187  The repressive wave in New York lost its 
momentum,188 and despite his best efforts, Attorney General Palmer 
failed to persuade Congress to enact a federal peacetime sedition law.189  
To be sure, anti-Red sentiment persisted, and state legislatures 
continued to pass criminal syndicalism and sedition statutes well into 
the following year.190  Still, it was clear that the tide had turned.  As 
Herbert Goodrich observed in an article on the constitutional protection 
of free speech, “We no longer jump with apprehension at hearing the 
 
 185 Frederick Pollock, Abrams v. United States, 36 L. Q. REV. 334, 336 (1920). 
 186 Wigmore, supra note 167, at 560. 
 187 Albany’s Ousted Socialists, LITERARY DIGEST, Jan. 24, 1920, at 19; BRIEF OF SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1920).  Chafee 
wrote that “with Governor Hughes’s letter on the 9th, the ebb set in.”  CHAFEE, supra note 
132, at 338.  
 188 See Thomas E. Vadney, The Politics of Repression: A Case Study of the Red Scare in 
New York, 49 N.Y. HIST. 56, 71–72 (1968); JULIAN F. JAFFE, CRUSADE AGAINST RADICALISM: NEW 
YORK DURING THE RED SCARE 147–50, 239 (1972).  
 189 JAFFE, supra note 188, at 177; National Civil Liberties Bureau, This Little Story is 
Entitled ‘God Bless the Lusk Committee’, Jan. 28, 1920, in Records of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore, Penn., Box 1.  
 190 MURPHY, supra note 8, at 42; see also PRESTON, supra note 32.  
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word ‘Bolshevist.’”191  In fact, by March 1920, the liberal Republican 
Joseph I. France could declare on the Senate floor that in comparison 
with the confiscation of property, it is “a worse form of bolshevism 
which confiscates real and personal rights.”192  
This period witnessed a revival among progressives (who 
increasingly were referring to themselves as liberals) of the language of 
constitutionalism, layered upon a critique of administrative abuses in 
the policing of suspected subversives.  In the summer of 1920, Zechariah 
Chafee was among the twelve lawyers and legal academics who issued 
the influential Report upon the Illegal Practices of the United States 
Department of Justice.193  The group, which also included Ernst Freund, 
Felix Frankfurter, and Roscoe Pound, condemned the Wilson 
administration for its lawless methods and its “continued violation of 
[the] Constitution,” including the “[w]holesale arrests both of aliens and 
citizens . . . without warrant or any process of law.”194  Although the 
report emphasized the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments rather 
than the First, Chafee considered the Department of Justice (together 
with the Post Office) to be equally accountable for abridging First 
Amendment freedoms.  Harry Weinberger and other civil liberties 
lawyers welcomed the outcry that public accusations by such prominent 
figures helped to generate.  “The more frequent the disregard of the 
Constitution[] . . . displayed by civil and military officials and by the 
courts themselves,” pronounced the League for Amnesty of Political 
Prisoners (of which Weinberger was a legal advisory board member), 
“the more dangerous the sentiment of resentment and lawlessness will 
become.”195  
The new enthusiasm for constitutional rights did not, however, 
translate into a judicial mandate for enforcing them.  The Abrams 
dissent, along with a handful of speech-protective Espionage Act cases 
in the lower courts,196 suggested the potential for courts to constrain 
lawless officials.  Chafee himself was instrumental in litigating an 
important victory in a 1920 deportation case, though the decision was 
subsequently overturned on appeal.197  Nonetheless, most progressives 
 
 191 Goodrich, supra note 10, at 487.  
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 195 LEAGUE FOR AMNESTY OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, IS OPINION A CRIME?, in ACLU Papers, 
supra note 31, vol. 116.  
 196 See MURPHY, supra note 33, at 179–247.  
 197 Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17 (D. Mass. 1920).  On Colyer v. Skeffington, see 
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continued to regard the courts with distrust, if not downright disdain.  
After all, the Red Scare had only exacerbated their impression that the 
courts elevated property rights over personal rights.  Judges (as well as 
juries) had proven enthusiastic censors in the wartime case.  Not only 
had they permitted Espionage Act prosecutions to go forward but they 
had actively expanded the sweep of the statutes through the doctrines 
of “bad tendency” and constructive intent.  As Ernst Freund put it, the 
locus of decision-making had simply shifted from an “arbitrary 
executive” to “arbitrary judicial power.”198 
How, then, did progressives imagine that freedom of speech might 
be vindicated?  Anticipating later calls for constitutionalism outside the 
courts, progressives looked to legislators and administrators to exercise 
moderation.  Even Zechariah Chafee accepted, after Abrams, that trial 
judges were inclined to construe sedition statutes in a speech-restrictive 
fashion, and the Supreme Court was unlikely to stand in the way.  “The 
lesson of United States v. Abrams,” he concluded “is that Congress alone 
can effectively safeguard minority opinion in times of excitement.”199  It 
was up to Congress to “change or abolish the Sedition Act of 1918, so 
that in future wars such a trial and such sentences for the intemperate 
criticism of questionable official action shall never again occur in these 
United States.”200 
In short, few progressives imagined that endorsing the Abrams 
dissent required accepting a role for court-centered constitutionalism—
and the handful who deemed the issues inseparable opted to reject the 
Abrams dissent instead.  For example, in reflecting on the Abrams 
decision, constitutional scholar Edward Corwin noted that many of the 
same scholars who were “endeavoring to-day to elaborate 
constitutional restrictions upon Congress’s power over the press” had 
previously opposed the judicial enforcement of “constitutional 
limitations” on congressional power.  In Corwin’s view, the reversal was 
ill-advised; “[I]t [was] much more to the point to insist upon the 
responsibility of legislators than their lack of power.”201  In a similar 
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WEINRIB (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:29 PM 
92 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:61 
vein, Herbert Goodrich inverted Holmes’s appeal in Abrams to the “free 
trade in ideas.”  He pointed approvingly to an emerging consensus that 
Lochner v. New York was wrongly decided and speculated that a similar 
logic would “uphold a law limiting the exercise of [one’s] tongue when 
the majority so wills it.”202  In Goodrich’s estimation, the progressive 
critique of freedom of contract had prevailed in the marketplace of 
ideas.  “If unrestricted speech cannot win in the same field,” he said, “we 
shall probably have to get along without it.”203 
IV.  ABRAMS, AMNESTY, AND LEGAL LEGITIMACY 
Simply put, in the aftermath of the Abrams dissent, neither lawyers 
nor legal scholars pressed Justice Holmes’s opinion into the service of 
legal liberalism.204  Progressives on the whole remained skeptical of 
court-centered constitutionalism and preferred to constrain 
majoritarian overreach and administrative arbitrariness through other 
means instead.  For their part, the conservatives who valorized the 
judiciary as a “citadel of justice” continued to distinguish between 
liberty and license, and they assigned subversive advocacy to the 
(unprotected) license side of the line.205  
That the Abrams dissent was not used to promote the judicial 
enforcement of the First Amendment does not, however, mean that it 
was not used at all.  In winter 1920, West Publishing Company ran an 
article entitled “Soviets and Sedition,” in which it reported that the 
Abrams case was “interesting and important, not only because of the 
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, but because of the use which 
the radical and revolutionary forces are already making of it in justifying 
their propagandism.”206  That “propagandism” took a particular form.  
The Abrams dissent was mobilized not to advance the judicial 
enforcement of personal and procedural rights but to prove that justice 
was unavailable to radical defendants in the courts.  
 
 202 Goodrich, supra note 10, at 500. 
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LIBERALISM 20–27 (1996). 
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at 37. 
 206 Soviets and Sedition, 3 WEST PUB. CO. DOCKET 2207, 2207 (1920); see also C.W. 
German, An Unfortunate Dissent, 20 U. MO. BULL. L. SER. 65, 80 (1920) (“[T]he ‘Rebels’ and 
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Advocates immediately identified the persuasive potential of the 
opinion in pursuit of their preferred remedy for the wartime 
suppression, which (in keeping with Progressive Era beliefs about 
institutional role) relied on the political branches rather than the courts: 
the campaign for a blanket amnesty of the Espionage Act defendants.  
Before and even during World War I, civil liberties groups had scored 
modest successes through negotiations with progressive officials.207  
The amnesty effort, spearheaded by a range of pacifist and radical 
organizations, initially had looked similarly promising.  The NCLB’s 
Roger Baldwin voiced a common sentiment when he speculated that “all 
these long sentences are merely paper”—that there would be a “general 
amnesty for political prisoners after the war.”208  Even before the 
armistice, respected public figures were urging “enlightened humanity” 
in the treatment of those imprisoned for criticizing the draft or 
American participation in the war.209  When the war ended, advocates 
were optimistic.210  Progressive senators proposed a general amnesty 
for those convicted during the war by court-martial, pointing to 
arbitrariness in sentencing.211  
But these early efforts faltered, and a general amnesty for 
Espionage and Sedition Act defendants never materialized.  Although 
President Wilson considered granting a partial amnesty, his advisors 
dissuaded him from doing so.212  Attorney General Thomas Gregory and 
his successor, A. Mitchell Palmer, each recommended about fifty 
commutations, and both were open to leniency in particular cases (a 
concession that only confirmed to advocates that “justice in America is 
a matter of favor and influence”).213  But in the summer of 1919, when 
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President Wilson expressed willingness to pardon “all American citizens 
in prison or under arrest on account of anything they have said in speech 
or in print concerning their personal opinions,”214 Palmer insisted that 
no such cases existed.215  
Determined to overcome these setbacks, proponents of a general 
amnesty fought even harder to sway public opinion and to persuade 
sympathetic officials.  In that effort, the Abrams dissent seemed a 
promising weapon.  Less than two weeks after the decision was handed 
down, Weinberger told the ACLU’s Albert DeSilver that “in view of Judge 
Holmes’ opinion, . . .  every American should understand that Amnesty 
should be declared.”216  In fact, he thought “effective work for amnesty 
can be swung around this case, as well, if not even better than the Debs 
case, because of the outrageous sentence.”217  DeSilver enthusiastically 
agreed.  “I think that the dissenting opinion in the Abrams case is a 
wonder,” he responded.  “We are going to put it to some use all right.”218  
Two features of Abrams made it especially appealing.  The first was 
the “ferocious sentences” (as the Nation described them219) that Judge 
Clayton meted out.  As a general rule, the amnesty campaign emphasized 
the “inequalities attending the administration of justice.”220  Disparities 
in sentences implied that judges were arbitrary or even vindictive, and 
they buttressed the case for executive intervention.  In November 1919, 
Weinberger wrote to the socialist leader and Presbyterian minister 
Norman Thomas, enclosing a copy of a favorable editorial in the 
mainstream press.  “Americans who run and only read headlines of 
plots, bombs, reds, etc., can even understand that these boys ought not 
to go to jail for 20 years,”221 he told Thomas.  Thomas evidently agreed.  
The World Tomorrow, the Christian socialist newspaper that Thomas 
edited, soon cited the case as the “clear[est] proof” yet of the 
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“breakdown of our so-called democracy” and asked whether “any 
sentence under the Czar’s regime was ever more cruel.”222 
Second, and relatedly, Weinberger and other advocates of amnesty 
underscored the abuses and irregularities that suffused the 
investigation and trial.223  They wagered correctly that respectable 
Americans would rally to the cause of procedural fairness even if they 
were ambivalent about the underlying offenses.  That was a lesson that 
civil liberties lawyers had internalized during World War I and used to 
good effect during the Red Scare.224  After all, “a fair trial in a court of 
justice” was a well-established constitutional right.225  Of course, 
procedural fairness was insufficient to safeguard radical agitation or 
unpopular ideas.226  Still, appeals to rule of law resonated broadly, and 
they could buttress support for executive intervention or administrative 
tolerance.  During the two years between the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Abrams and the defendants’ eventual deportation, amnesty 
proponents repeatedly justified their efforts by reference to the case.  In 
the summer of 1920, Wilson challenged amnesty groups to identify a 
single citizen who was in prison due to unjustifiable persecution.227  The 
ACLU responded in a public letter stating that the Abrams defendants 
were serving fifteen- and twenty-year sentences for the distribution of 
handbills “which, in the opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice 
Holmes, they had as much right to distribute as the Constitution of the 
United States.”228  
Abrams had appeared in amnesty literature even before the 
Supreme Court issued its decision.  In a pamphlet entitled “Why Should 
There Be an Amnesty,” the NCLB invoked the case as a prime example 
of judicial misconduct.  “The record of the trial abounds with instances 
of the atmosphere of prejudice and rancor that filled the court-room,” it 
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reported.229  But it was one thing for advocates to describe a trial as 
biased, and another to rely on a justice of the United States Supreme 
Court.  A minority opinion by Justice Holmes was capable of convincing 
even “capitalistic newspapers” that an “intolerable injustice” had 
occurred.230  However loudly radicals and pacifists might complain of 
injustice,  their cries echoed faintly in comparison with a reference in 
the New York American to “the painful spectacle of four persons 
imprisoned practically for life for printing a leaflet which two of the 
Justices of the Supreme Court flatly assert they had a perfect legal right 
to print.”231  Exploring the plight of “political prisoners” for the Survey in 
August 1920, the social worker Loula Lasker cited Abrams as the “case 
which has probably been called most forcibly to the attention of the 
public.”232  
Weinberger’s effort to characterize the trial as incompatible with 
the norms of legal legitimacy found its most powerful champion in 
Zechariah Chafee, who believed that the Supreme Court’s failure to 
reverse the conviction had shifted the responsibilities to the “pardoning 
authorities . . . to remedy the injustice.”233  Relying on his 
correspondence with Weinberger and on the publicity materials that 
Weinberger prepared and supplied, Chafee argued in the Harvard Law 
Review that “the whole proceeding, from start to finish, has been a 
disgrace to our law.”234  He described the “systematic arrest of civilians 
by soldiers on the streets of New York City” as an unprecedented 
departure from legal norms.235  Although the witnesses who arrested 
and interrogated the defendants denied abuse, Chafee considered the 
allegations of brutality, which were “disquietingly specific and sincere,” 
to be troubling.236  At trial, Judge Clayton had breached the norms of 
judicial neutrality by cross-examining the witnesses and allowing the 
jury to convict the defendants “for their Russian sympathies and their 
anarchistic views.”237  He had routinely interrupted and ridiculed them 
(“[l]egal historians,” Chafee forewarned, “have always taken interest in 
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the criminal judge who jests with the lives of men”).238  And the 
sentences he handed out were outrageously long.  Indeed, they could not 
have been longer had the defendants “tie[d] up every munition plant in 
the country.”239  Chafee stressed that he had no affinity for the 
defendants’ underlying political and economic views.  “My sympathies 
and all my associations are with the men who save, who manage and 
produce,” he later told the Harvard Club.  But he wanted his “side to fight 
fair,” and he regarded the Abrams prosecution “as a distinctly unfair 
piece of fighting.”240 
To be sure, Chafee’s account of the trial was not universally 
accepted.241  But the article went a long way toward shaping the public 
perception of the case.  Frederick Pollock drew heavily on Chafee’s 
account in describing Abrams as a “singular disregard of judicial fairness 
and of the principles of justice,” and he echoed Chafee (and, in turn, 
Weinberger) in describing Judge Clayton’s sentences as draconian.242  
Other lawyers and scholars followed suit.  When a newly organized bar 
association committee sought an example of wartime abuses, the ACLU 
pointed to Abrams.  “I guarantee that that record will shock any open-
minded lawyer,” Albert DeSilver offered, citing Chafee’s “admirable 
analysis of it in the current number of the Law Review.”243  Chafee also 
drew the case to the attention of his colleagues at Harvard Law School, 
who responded with outrage.  Felix Frankfurter had “no hesitation” in 
pronouncing it the “most disgraceful record of a criminal case” in the 
federal courts that he had ever read.244  Frankfurter and Roscoe Pound 
both joined Chafee in signing a petition to President Wilson requesting 
amnesty for the defendants.245 
In the end, advocates’ efforts to leverage the Abrams case into a 
general amnesty were unsuccessful.  On the campaign trail in October 
1920, Warren G. Harding conveyed that he saw “no essential differences 
between ordinary crimes and ordinary criminals on the one hand, and 
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WEINRIB (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:29 PM 
98 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:61 
political crimes and political prisoners on the other hand.”246  Harding’s 
attorney general was similarly unencouraging in a 1921 address to the 
American Bar Association.  Pronouncing it “the duty of the minority as 
well as the majority to obey the law,” and the responsibility of the 
Department of Justice to enforce it, Harry Daugherty enjoined “those 
who do not believe in our government and the enforcement of our laws 
[to] go to a country which gives them their peculiar liberty.”247  
Throughout the 1920s, lawyers and advocates exerted quiet pressure 
on Washington and negotiated commutations for a few prisoners at a 
time.  Only in 1933 did President Franklin D. Roosevelt finally issue a 
blanket amnesty of the wartime prisoners.  
As for the Abrams defendants, after much wrangling, Weinberger 
secured commutations of their sentences in exchange for deportation to 
the Soviet Union at their own expense.  In that effort, too, the Abrams 
dissent proved instrumental.  As the Miami Valley Socialist explained, 
“The fact that a dissenting opinion was rendered by Justice Holmes 
[was] used as the basis for the appeal for executive clemency.”248 
Harding agreed to release the defendants in November 1921, one month 
before the release of Eugene V. Debs.  According to the New York Call, it 
was the final chapter of “one of the most celebrated of all the cases 
brought under the Espionage Act.”249  It was in Abrams, the Call 
reminded readers, that Justices Holmes and Brandeis had first 
denounced that “interpretation of justice which deprived the 
defendants of their constitutional rights.”250  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Today, Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States is 
remembered as a blueprint for the modern First Amendment, a 
harbinger of the judicial enforcement of civil liberties.  In its day, that 
characterization of the opinion would have been baffling.  In the 1920s, 
organized opposition to the prosecution of political dissenters drew 
heavily on Justice Holmes’s dissent in the Abrams case.  But the goal of 
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that publicity was to discredit the judiciary as an institution, not to 
bolster it.  In promoting Justice Holmes’s articulation of the procedural 
infirmities of the Abrams trial, advocates could not have anticipated that 
the dissent would someday be remembered as an emblem of court-
centered constitutionalism. 
The point is not that contemporaries failed to appreciate Holmes’s 
articulation of the value of free speech.  On the contrary, Holmes’s 
colorful turns of phrase were accorded pride of place in pamphlets and 
editorials, and the fledgling ACLU eagerly incorporated the opinion’s 
most memorable paragraph into its new statement of principles.251  Yet 
Holmes’s disagreement with the majority was not invoked in support of 
a positive program to strengthen judicial review.  It was offered instead 
as evidence of the “extent of the Courts’ departure from the principle of 
civil liberty.”252  Put simply, it was clear after Abrams that “the Supreme 
Court [had] gone over to the side of reaction.”253  And the only tenable 
solution was to weaken judicial power.   
A pair of articles in the New Republic captures this approach well.  
Throughout the 1920s, the New Republic adhered to its earlier, 
progressive view that the legislature was the institution best suited to 
policing the First Amendment.  The solution to unjust laws, its editors 
insisted, was to repeal them—not to seek their invalidation in the 
courts.  It was therefore unsurprising when a December article on 
Abrams reached two preliminary conclusions about its effects.  First, it 
presumed that the court had “succeeded in making out of four 
unbalanced and incoherent Russians four martyrs in the cause of true 
Americanism”; after all, there was no surer way to make martyrs of 
agitators than to imprison them for the expression of ideas.254  The 
second implication was no less unexpected.  With Abrams, the Court had 
“shifted to Congress the task of preserving the spirit of the First 
Amendment as a living force in American law.”255 
The following April, in an article entitled “The Supreme Court vs. 
the Supreme Court,” the New Republic once again examined the Abrams 
case.256  This time, it juxtaposed the Court’s wartime speech decisions, 
which it characterized as cases involving “human rights,” with its 
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decisions involving “property rights.”257  According to the editors, 
reading the two categories of cases together demanded a “consideration 
of the safeguards to be imposed upon the extraordinary judicial power 
of the Supreme Court.”258  Although they acknowledged that the justices’ 
views did not line up squarely along the lines of class interest, they 
thought it clear that the Court “manifest[s] a different attitude towards 
the acquisition and protection of property than towards other aspects 
of human liberty.”259  Complications aside, they continued, “No candid 
student of Supreme Court decisions can say that some of its members 
do not, unconsciously at least, illustrate the economic interpretation of 
history.”260  The editors did not offer a solution.  They did, however, 
question “the wisdom of leaving the ultimate law-making power of the 
nation to nine men.”261 
That critics of the Court impugned the justices simultaneously “for 
sustaining or for overthrowing acts of Congress” was not lost on 
conservatives.262  Assessing “the new attack upon the independence of 
the judiciary,” the presiding judge of the Kansas Court of Industrial 
Relations identified three principal categories of cases “productive of 
the present campaign to discredit the courts and to limit their power.”263  
Two of those categories—judicial decisions curbing union activity and 
invalidating social and economic legislation—involved longstanding 
grievances.264  The third was a new addition to “propaganda against the 
courts”: “the alleged invasion of free speech and free press by such 
decisions as the Abrams case.”265  
For the time being, progressives continued to regard the three 
faces of judicial malfeasance as intimately related.  That was a position 
articulated forcefully by Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette, “the 
recognized champion of the movement to limit the power of the 
courts.”266  A former law partner of the civil liberties lawyer Gilbert Roe, 
he was also an outspoken advocate for free speech.267  In fact he was 
among the few senators who had opposed the Espionage Act and had 
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pushed to preserve open channels “for free public discussion of 
governmental policies” during the war.268  For over a decade, La Follette 
had believed that democratic legitimacy required greater popular 
oversight of the courts, and he had proposed court-curbing mechanisms 
ranging from the recall of judges to a congressional override of Supreme 
Court decisions.  Speaking to the 1922 annual convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, he pointed to a long list of state and 
federal cases invalidating progressive reform legislation and 
undermining union power.269  But alongside the many judicial decisions 
exercising judicial authority to undermine social and economic 
progress, La Follette held out Abrams for special reprobation.  “To my 
mind this case, involving the fundamental right of freedom of speech, 
best illustrates the extreme length to which the court is prepared to go 
under the influence of its prejudices and passions,” he said.270  After 
Abrams, it was time to “face[] the fundamental issue of judicial 
usurpation squarely . . . once and for all.”271  Notably, La Follette’s view 
found ample support among the champions of free speech.  The 
organizations that endorsed his proposed constitutional amendment to 
abolish judicial review of congressional legislation included the ACLU, 
which emphasized in a 1924 statement that “the courts had been as 
flagrant violators of civil liberties as the legislative and executive 
branches of government.”272   
The theory of the First Amendment we now associate with Abrams 
v. United States would not take root for at least another decade.  The 
story of its success is a messy and protracted one.  In part, the old 
progressive preference for toleration and accommodation in the 
political branches seemed increasingly fanciful, and the potential for 
administrative overreach increasingly grave.  In any case, the self-
described “partisans of labor” who spearheaded the interwar civil 
liberties movement and founded the ACLU had never trusted the state 
as progressives did.273  Their efforts to secure protection for labor’s 
rights to picket and boycott would lead them to advocate a strong First 
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Amendment, and eventually and ambivalently, to seek its enforcement 
in the courts.  
Along the way, they would forge an unlikely alliance with a cadre 
of conservative lawyers.  Already in 1920, a self-described 
“Conservative Constitutionalist” writing in praise of the Abrams dissent 
deemed it necessary to protect the “free trade in ideas,” lest propaganda 
prosper, “false news” go unanswered, and “minorities perish.”274  A few 
years later, as labor militancy and radical agitation receded into hazy 
memory, his admittedly aberrational assessment would begin to attain 
broader purchase.  With the specter of revolution safely behind them, 
conservatives could embrace Justice Holmes’s proclamation that the 
“surreptitious publishing of a silly leaflet by an unknown man” posed 
little danger to American institutions.275  Free speech came at low cost, 
with large potential gains for property rights and judicial legitimacy. 
When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Abrams v. United 
States, and Justice Holmes penned his historic dissent, all of this was in 
the future.  In 1919, no one envisaged that Holmes would persuade the 
Court to extend First Amendment protection to subversive expression.  
For the time being, the justices showed no inclination to “doubt either 
[their] power or [their] premises.”276  There was little indication that 
free speech would become a core constitutional commitment, let alone 
a formidable constraint on government authority.  
Notably, the New Republic predicted that Justice Holmes’s dissent 
in Abrams would “bulk as important in future discussion of the judicial 
interpretation of legislation which limits freedom of speech as the same 
Justice’s dissenting opinion in the case of Lochner vs. New York did in 
relation to judicial interpretation of laws which invoked the police 
power.”277  To draw out the parallel, they anticipated that the opinion 
would influence scholarly opinion.  They thought it would serve as a 
rallying cry and a catalyst for public debate.  But it would have been 
foolish to expect Holmes to sway his fellow justices to protect unfettered 
speech, any more than he had convinced them to abandon liberty of 
contract.  In fact, contemporaries saw the two decisions as sides of the 
same coin.  As an early comment on the case observed, Abrams 
ensconced the Constitution as “an airtight, four-walled compartment 
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designed to preserve at all costs the status quo economically as well as 
politically.”278  
That was hardly a path to deliberative freedom.  Indeed, the 
staunchest interwar advocates of the First Amendment regarded 
Abrams as the deathblow to constitutional litigation in pursuit of free 
speech.  Despite its stirring dissent, the Abrams case had left “the status 
of civil liberty hopeless so far as it is the concern of courts of law.”279 
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